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COMMENT
A COUNTRY WITH A CONSCIENCE? THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DEVELOPS A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE OF REFUGEE LAW
GIvE ME YOUR TIRED, YOUR POOR, YOUR HUDDLED MASSES YEARN-
ING TO BREATHE FREE; THE WRETCHED REFUSE OF YOUR TEEMING
SHORE. SEND THESE, THE HOMELESS, TEMPEST-TOST TO ME, I LIFT
MY LAMP BESIDE THE GOLDEN DOOR.
-Emma Lazarus, The New Colossus 1, 1888.
I. INTRODUCTON
Worldwide, over 16 million people are fleeing from their homelands
to escape oppression, torture and death.' For many, the prospect of ad-
mission to their destination country may be the only ray of hope in their
dark journey to freedom. To illustrate, imagine John M., a citizen of
Honduras, unwillingly drafted into the military at the age of fourteen.
One day, after serving for several years, the military ordered him to kill
his friend for desertion. He refused to execute the order, fully knowing
the consequences of his decision. He subsequently fled his homeland,
and illegally entered the United States. The appropriate authorities de-
tected his presence, and brought him before an immigration judge, where
he applied for political asylum.2 A critical question must be resolved by
1. OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, THE STATE
OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES: THE CHALLENGE OF PROTECTION 24 (1993). It is estimated
that eighty to one-hundred million people have sought to reside outside their country of
origin. And each year, 150,000 to 300,000 of those individuals are granted resettlement
into other countries, two million of which seek asylum from their homeland. Id. And
each day, 10,000 individuals become refugees. Id. at 1.
2. An individual who arrives in the United States may apply for political asylum if
he or she qualifies as a refugee. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158 (1996). A refugee is defined as "any
person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or ...any country in
(257)
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the immigration court: Was John M.'s desertion of the military an expres-
sion of political opinion?
The above scenario describes the facts of the Ninth Circuit case, Ra-
mos-Vasquez v. Immigration and Naturalization Service.3 In Ramos-
Vasquez, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that desertion of
the military is an expression of political opinion which satisfies the statu-
tory requirement of refugee status.4 In reaching this conclusion, the court
relied heavily upon international law, and concluded that refusing to par-
ticipate in acts condemned by the international community may be
grounds for asylum based upon political opinion.5 The court has opened
a proverbial Pandora's Box, causing other federal courts to take notice of
the international repercussions of sending a refugee like John M. back to
hands of his persecutors.
This note will discuss the Ninth Circuit's treatment of the "political
opinion" standard and its strict interpretation of international and United
States refugee law. Section I will examine the Ramos-Vasquez decision,
which addresses, but does not completely resolve, whether refusal to par-
ticipate in an act that violates human rights practices is an expression of
a political opinion. Next follows a discussion of the status of interna-
tional law, which examines the history, regulations, and international
treaties concerning refugees. Section Im examines United States refugee
law, including the Refugee Act of 1980 and applicable legal precedent.
Finally, section IV provides a legal analysis of the Ramos-Vasquez deci-
sion in light of international and United States law, and concludes that
the Ramos-Vasquez decision marks a significant change in immigration
law relating to the status of political refugees.
II. THE CASE
Jacobo Ramos-Vasquez was born in Honduras in 1954.6 The Hondu-
ran Army drafted him at the age of fourteen. 7 He was placed in the intel-
ligence unit, where the army did not permit voluntary departure.8 In Oc-
tober of 1982, after thirteen years of service, Ramos-Vasquez deserted
which such person has last habitually resided, and who ... is unable or unwilling to
avail himself or herself of the protection of that country because persecution or a well
founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion." 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1982).
3. 57 F.3d 857 (9th Cir. 1995).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 864.
6. Id. at 860.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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the army, refusing to execute a friend who had deserted.9 After deserting
the army, Ramos-Vasquez left Honduras and went to Guatemala.' 0
He entered the United States in 1983 and began working as a gar-
dener." In October of 1988, his illegal presence in the U.S. was detected,
and he received an Order to Show Cause from the Immigration and Nat-
uralization Service ("INS"). 2 Approximately one month later at a depor-
tation hearing13 before an Immigration Judge ("U"), 4 Ramos-Vasquez
conceded deportability, and the U granted him leave either to apply for
asylum' 5 and withholding of deportation, or to exercise voluntary depar-
ture.' 6 In May of 1989, at his hearing for asylum and withholding of de-
9. Id. He asserts that, customarily, deserters were placed in handcuffs, submerged
while naked in a tank of water for nine days, executed, and dumped in a river. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. The deportation process officially commences with the issuance of an "Order
to Show Cause" why the alien is not deportable by the INS. 8 C.F.R. § 242.1 (a). The
Code of Federal Regulations requires that all orders to show cause must contain: 1) a
statement of the nature of the proceeding, 2) a concise statement of the factual allegations
supporting the order, 3) the legal authority under which the order was brought, and 4) a
recitation of the specific provisions violated by the alien. This order serves as notice to
the individual that he or she must appear at a hearing before an INS Immigration Judge,
(hereinafter "U") to provide evidence of his or her legal right to remain in the U.S. 8
C.F.R. § 242.1(b).
13. The purpose of the deportation hearing is to determine whether the alien has the
legal right to remain in the U.S. The individual is first advised of his/her rights and is
asked to admit or deny the allegations of the order. 8 C.F.R. § 242.16. At this time the
alien may also apply for discretionary relief, such as asylum and withholding of deporta-
tion, or voluntary departure. See generally 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(a) (regarding asylum); 8
U.S.C.A. § 1253(h)(1) (regarding withholding of deportation).
14. Immigration Judges are selected by the Attorney General to conduct exclusion
and deportation proceedings on behalf of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. 8
U.S.C.A. § 1101(b)(4). The Immigration and Nationality Act provides that the Immigra-
tion Judge shall "conduct proceedings under this section to determine the deportability of
any alien, and shall administer oaths, present and receive evidence, interrogate, examine,
and cross-examine the alien or witnesses, and . . . shall make determinations, including
orders of deportation." 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(b). It should be noted that this act allows the
Immigration Judge to serve as both the judge and prosecutor during the deportation
proceeding.
15. Unlike other forms of discretionary relief, asylum does not guarantee permanent
residence in the United States. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(b). Under the Refugee Act of
1980, an alien may apply for asylum if he or she satisfies the definitional requirements of
a refugee. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. After a period of one year, if the
alien's refugee status has not been terminated or he has not been afforded permanent sta-
tus as a resident, the INS will determine whether the individual should be granted perma-
nent residence. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158.
16. Ramos-Vasquez, 57 F.3d at 860.
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portation, Ramos-Vasquez testified that he was forced to serve thirteen
years with the army.17 He also testified that he conscientiously objected
to orders to extort money from farm workers, and refused to follow or-
ders to shoot deserters. 18 Ramos-Vasquez also asserted that the army
would torture' 9 and kill him for deserting if he returned to Honduras, and
that he had knowledge through a friend that the army was still searching
for him.2° He introduced additional testimony that he was twice shot in
the head in 1978 by a soldier,2' and that he feared persecution by anti-
military forces upon his return.2 Finally, Ramos-Vasquez produced sev-
eral letters verifying his good character and reliability as a worker?3
The U conceded that Ramos-Vasquez was credible, but concluded
that he did not present enough evidence to show a clear probability that
the Honduran government would persecute him because of his desertion
from the military.24 Ramos-Vasquez appealed the decision of the U to the
Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"). 25 The BIA affirmed the U's
finding that the Petitioner failed to satisfy the requirements for withhold-
ing of deportation and asylum.26 The majority determined that the water
tank punishment inflicted on Ramos-Vasquez was common treatment for
soldiers who refused to execute orders, and therefore was not persecutory
in nature.27 However, they failed to consider whether Ramos-Vasquez's
fear of being executed by the army upon return to Honduras satisfied the
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. Each year, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
("UNHCR") recommends an average of 120 tortured refugees for priority resettlement in
other countries where they can safely reside without fear of persecution. However, prior-
ity resettlement is reserved for the most severe cases of torture, thus comprising only a
small percentage of those who seek refuge due to physical and mental torture. UNHCR,
THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES: THE CHALLENGE OF PROTECTION 23 (1993).
20. Ramos-Vasquez, 57 F3d at 860.
21. Id. Ramos-Vasquez asserted that he was shot because he was mistaken for his
father. Id.
22. Id. at 861.
23. Id. at 860. At the asylum hearing, the alien is permitted to present evidence that
he qualifies for refugee status, including testimony, affidavits, witnesses, and tangible evi-
dence. 8 C.F.R. § 242.14. Such evidence is customarily admissible if it is material and
relevant to the issues being adjudicated. Id.; 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158.
24. Ramos-Vasquez, 57 F.3d at 860.
25. The Board of Immigration Appeals is the sole arbiter which determines the ini-
tial validity of the decision of the Immigration Judge. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(a)(1). The BIA has
the power to dismiss or remand a case to the Immigration Judge. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(d),(h).
Most decisions are based principally on the record of the deportation or exclusion,briefs
submitted by counsel, and oral argument. 8 C.F.R. § 3.5.
26. Ramos-Vasquez, 57 E3d at 860. See supra note 2.
27. Id.
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requisite well-founded fear of persecution.21 This error was a direct result
of the BIA's conclusion that Ramos-Vasquez was not a credible witness.29
The dissenting member of the Board disputed the majority's finding that
Ramos-Vasquez was not credible, basing his opinion upon the affidavits
and convincing evidence of persecution through testimony Ramos-
Vasquez presented.30 Ramos-Vasquez timely appealed the decision of the
BIA to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.3
The Ninth Circuit reviewed the decision of the BIA to decide
whether it had abused its discretion in ruling that the Petitioner did not
qualify for asylum and the withholding of deportation.32 The court evalu-
ated the factual findings of the BIA under a substantial evidence standard
of review.33 It found the BIA's determination that Vasquez was not credi-
ble to be unsupported by the substantial evidence in the record.34 The
three judge panel rejected the reasoning of the BIA, vacating the order to
deport Vasquez and remanding the case for further consideration of
whether his desertion was an expression of a political opinion.35 It addi-
tionally held that the BIA's failure to specifically consider whether Ra-
mos-Vasquez's testimony regarding treatment of military deserters consti-
tuted evidence establishing his eligibility for withholding of deportation
and asylum was reversible error.36
A. Summary of the Court's Reasoning
In Ramos-Vasquez, the court first addressed Ramos-Vasquez's argu-
ment that the BIA's finding that he was not a credible witness was un-
supported by substantial evidence. 37 The court agreed with the BIA dis-
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 861.
33. Id. (citations omitted).
34. See infia note 97 and accompanying text.
35. Ramos-Vasquez, 57 F.3d at 864.
36. Id. at 862. Judge Stephen Trott concurred with the majority that the Ninth Cir-
cuit should remand the case because of the inadequacy of the BIA's credibility findings,
but was wary of the court's guidance regarding the execution of military deserters, and
did not join that section of the court's decision. Id. at 864.
37. Id. at 861 (citing Turcios v. INS, 821 F.2d 1396, 1399 (9th Cir. 1987)). The
Ninth Circuit standard for reviewing credibility findings of the U and the BIA is whether
the decision was supported by substantial evidence, based upon the Supreme Court deci-
sion INS v. Elias Zacarias. See 502 U.S. 478, 480 (1992); See also 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(4)
(stating that agency decisions should be upheld if "supported by reasonable, substantial,
and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.").
1996]
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sent and determined that the evidence presented by Vasquez
"overwhelmingly contradicts the BIA's finding of adverse credibility."38
It found that the U's opinion that Ramos-Vasquez was "in every way a
credible witness," as based upon testimony, letters, and affidavits
presented by Ramos-Vasquez, 39 to be dispositive in resolving the issueA°
The Court concluded that the BIA's refusal to believe the testimony of
Vasquez was erroneous, and rejected its finding of adverse credibility.
The court then flatly rejected Vasquez's argument that the shooting
by a soldier who mistook him for his father was evidence of persecution
on account of political opinion. 41 Although the Ninth Circuit had recog-
nized persecutions of family members to be grounds for establishing a
well-founded fear of persecution,42 Vasquez had not shown that the vio-
lence was a method of persecuting the petitioner because of his political
opinion, according to the court.43
Additionally, it rejected Ramos-Vasquez's argument, that he feared
retaliation by anti-military forces who would impute to him the actions
of the military if he returned to Honduras, as capable of furnishing the
requisite fear of persecution necessary for political asylum.44 It concluded
that mere apprehension of persecution is insufficient to establish a well-
founded fear for granting of asylum,45 and that the BIA did not abuse its
discretion in rejecting the applicant's claim on this basis.46
38. Ramos-Vasquez, 57 F.3d at 860.
39. Id. Ramos-Vaquez presented several letters verifying his good character and reli-
ability as a worker.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Ramos-Vasquez, 57 F.3d at 861 (citing Arriaga-Barrientos v. INS, 937 F.2d
411,414 (9th Cir. 1991)).
43. Id.
44. Id. Although usually the fear must be the result of actions by governmental enti-
ties, it has been recognized that persecution by anti-government forces may satisfy the
"well founded fear" requirement. Rodriquez-Rivera v. INS, 848 F.2d 998, 1002 (9th Cir.
1988). However, the fear must be genuine in the subjective opinion of the applicant. The
applicant is required to make an objective showing of facts, by specific evidence in the
record, that would support the applicant claim of reasonable fear. Id.
45. It should be noted that according to the Handbook on Procedures and Criteria
for Determining Refugee Status (hereinafter "the Handbook"), whether prejudicial actions
other than those falling within the five listed factors depends upon the particular circum-
stances of each case, and should be considered based upon an evaluation of the opinions
and feelings of the person involved. OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR REFUGEES. HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE
STATUS, at 14 (1979)(hereinafter, "Handbook").
46. Id. (citing Arriaga-Barrientos v. INS, 937 F.2d 411, 414 (9th Cir. 1991)).
[Vol. 20
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Finally, the court addressed the central issue of whether the punish-
ment for desertion that Vasquez feared amounted to persecution because
of political opinion. It disagreed with the BIA's opinion that Ramos-
Vasquez "would voluntarily spend so much time in a unit that ostensibly
carried out summary executions if [he] ... was so repulsed by such du-
ties." 47 Because the BIA found that Vasquez' testimony was not credible,
they did not consider the execution of military deserters as evidence that
established his eligibility for refugee status.48 The court also noted that
when the record contained no evidence to support adverse credibility,
federal law requires that the BIA consider the applicant's claims for asy-
lum and withholding of deportation separately.49
The Ninth Circuit then found reversible error in the BIA's failure to
distinguish between the two separate forms of relief requested by Vas-
quez. 5° Relying heavily upon the Refugee Act5P 1 and previous Supreme
Court rulings, the Court noted the BIA's failure to use the two prong test
established by the Supreme Court.52 This test requires both a subjective
showing and an objective showing by the applicant that he has the requi-
site fear of persecution for political asylum.53 The court found that Vas-
47. Id.
48. Id. at 862. The BIA in its majority opinion stated "we do not find the punish-
ment meted out to the respondent to be persecutory in nature.... If the Honduran army
desires to punish its soldiers by placing them in water-filled tanks for 24 hours, this
Board is in no position to pass judgment."
49. Id. (citations omitted). The statutory provision which governs the withholding of
deportation is section 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h).
Asylum is governed by section 208 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a). Section 243(h) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act requires the withholding of deportation of an alien to a
country if the Attorney General determines that the "alien's life or freedom would be
threatened in such country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a par-
ticular social group, or political opinion." Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277,
1281 (9th Cir. 1984). In INS v. Stevic, the Supreme Court held that an alien must prove
that it is "more likely than not that the alien would be subject to persecution" upon re-
turn to his country of origin. 467 U.S. 407, 424-30 (1984).
50. Ramos-Vasquez, 57 F.3d at 862; See also infra notes 100 & 104, and accompa-
nying text. The court determined that the Board's failure to specify which standard it was
applying when it denied Ramos-Vasquez relief was reversible error. The two standards
which the court admonished the BIA to apply were the "more likely than not" standard
which governs withholding of deportation procedures, and the "well-founded fear" re-
quirement which governs asylum applications. Ramos-Vasquez, 57 F.3d at 862.
51. Id. See also infra notes 100 & 104,and accompanying text.
52. Id. See also infra notes 100 & 104, and accompanying text.
53. Id. (Citation omitted). See also INS v. Cardoza-Fonesca, 480 U.S. 421, 430-431
(1987). In Cardoza-Fonesca, the Court announced that for a grant of asylum, the review-
ing court must examine both the subjective feelings of the applicant, and the objective
reasons for that person's fear. The Court also determined earlier in INS v. Stevic, that "it
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quez' testimony, lacking adverse credibility, would likely support a claim
for asylum in the United States.54 It also determined that the BIA and the
U had improperly concluded that being asked to execute military desert-
ers was "merely an 'unpleasant' military duty," and that they had
thereby ignored the fact that Vasquez himself was in fear of persecution
for desertion from the military upon his return to Honduras. 55 According
to the court, being ordered to murder another individual is more than an
"unpleasant duty," it is an act that is in direct contravention of "basic
rules of human conduct."' 6 To support this contention, the court cited the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Handbook
on the Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status.57 The
court observed that punishment for refusing to take military action that
the international community condemns as contrary to the basic rules of
human conduct could be regarded as persecution.58 The United Nations
Handbook provided " 'significant guidance' " for the court's determina-
tion that punishment for military desertion could constitute persecution
for obtaining political asylum.59
The court then turned to Vasquez' argument that he satisfied the re-
quirements of refugee status because his desertion was an expression of
his political opinion. Vasquez based his claim of persecution on his polit-
need not be shown that the situation will probably end in persecution, but it is enough
that persecution is a reasonable possibility." 467 U.S. 407, 424-25 (1984). Therefore, a
reasonable possibility standard can also be utilized in examining whether an applicant
qualifies for asylum.
54. Ramos-Vasquez, 57 F.3d at 863. As the requirement for asylum is more difficult
to satisfy than that for withholding of deportation, it is likely that Ramos-Vasquez would
qualify for withholding of deportation also.
55. Id. at 863. Such a statement is in direct contravention to the purpose of the in-
temational asylum laws, which were designed to provide protection to those who have
suffered at the hands of those who violate the human rights of others residing within their
borders. It additionally evidences the need for a uniform definition of terms which may
provide clear guidance to tribunals and officers charged with determining the fate of asy-
lum seekers throughout the world. See generally GEL LOESCHER, BEYOND CHARrrY: INTER-
NATIONAL COOPERATION AND THE GLOBAL REFUGEE CRISIS, 140-43 (1993).
56. Ramos-Vasquez, 57 F.3d at 863.
57. The court relied on Section 171 of the United Nations Handbook, which states:
[Wihere ... the type of military action, with which an indi-
vidual does not wish to be associated, is condemned by the
international community as contrary to the rules of basic
human conduct, punishment for desertion... could, in light
of all other requirements of the definition, in itself be re-
garded as persecution.
Handbook, at Chapter V, Section 171.
58. Id.
59. Id. (citation omitted).
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ical neutrality, 6° which was exemplified his refusal to follow military or-
ders to execute deserters as an expression of political opinion. 6' The
court cited prior Ninth Circuit cases for the proposition that political neu-
trality is an expression of political opinion for purposes of asylum.62 The
applicant must not only affirm his political neutrality, but he must also
show that he sufficiently expressed his opinion so as to place himself in
danger of persecution, according to the majority.63 The majority acknowl-
edged that the Ninth Circuit and the BIA have recognized conscientious
objections to participation in military actions that are contrary to accept-
able human rights practices as grounds for relief for withholding of de-
portation. 64 The court found Barraza-Rivera v. INS to be dispositive in its
determination that Vasquez' refusal to perform inhuman acts ordered by
the military was ground for political asylum.6
Finally, the Court considered the policies and laws of the nation of
Honduras.66 As a democratic nation that provides due process of law and
constitutional protections against torture and capital punishment, the
Court concluded that military desertion may be the most efficacious way
for Vasquez to express a political opinion.67 And, if a soldier is reasona-
bly likely to face persecution if he returns to his country, then desertion
is grounds for asylum based on the expression of his political opinion.68
60. Id. See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
61. Id.
62. Id. See Arriaga-Barrientos v. INS, 937 F.2d 411, 413 (9th Cir. 1991); Arteaga v.
INS, 836 F.2d 1227, 1231-32 (9th Cir. 1988); Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277,
1286-87 (9th Cir. 1984).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 864.
65. Id. at 863.
66. Id. at 864. The court noted that Honduras purports to be a democratic nation,
which follows the laws stipulated in its Constitution. As such it must observe the consti-
tutional protections of human life and due process of law. It held that because Ramos-
Vasquez left Honduras after the Constitution had been adopted, it would apply to his situ-
ation. The court also observed that although the Honduran government is not bound by
the United States interpretation of due process, it is bound by its own. In doing so, it
notes that the Honduran constitution provides similar protections as the constitution of the
United States. Id. See Constitution of the Republic of Honduras, No.131, Title m, Chs.I-
I1, Art.59-64(1982)(Hon.).
67. Id. at 864.
68. Id. Justice Stephen Trott concurred in the opinion of the majority, agreeing that
the BIA's treatment of Vasquez' testimony was unusual, and that the Ninth Circuit should
remand the case for further proceedings. In a brief statement, he concluded that he was
unwilling to join in Part IV of the majority's opinion because he disagreed with the gui-
dance offered to the BIA regarding the treatment of military deserters.
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. International Law
1. The History of International Refugee Law
Since the early 1930's, international efforts to obligate nations to ob-
serve a consistent standard of treatment of refugees have been a major
priority. The 1933 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees was the
first instrument introduced to define the status of immigrants. 69 However,
World War H required the creation of an instrument that would allow the
international community to limit the mass influx of postwar refugees. In
1951, the United Nations called an international conference in Geneva,
assembling plenipotentiaries of major countries to adopt a universal defi-
nition of a refugee.70 Signed by 109 countries, the 1951 Convention was
designed to define the status of refugees who resided in Europe before
January 1, 1951, the date of the adoption of the Convention.7' The defini-
tion provided by the Convention affords refugee status to individuals who
have a fear of being persecuted based upon their race, religion, national-
ity, social group, or political opinion.72 Although no party to the Conven-
tion has an obligation to admit refugees, 73 this standard provides substan-
69. 1938 Convention Relating to the International Status of Refugees, 192 L.N.T.S.
59.
70. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 25, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137.
71. Article 1 of the Convention provides in pertinent part:
A. For purposes of the present Convention, the term "refu-
gee" shall apply to any person who: (2) As a result of
events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, relig-
ion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and
is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail him-
self of the protection of that country; or who, not having a
nationality and being outside the country of his former habit-
ual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing
to such fear is unwilling to return to it.
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature July 28 (Stat.), 1951,
U.S.T. 6260, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 189 U.N.T.S. 137.
The Convention allows states to interpret the "occurring before January 1, 1951"
language to mean either occurring in Europe before January 1, 1951 or Europe and else-
where before January 1, 1951. Fullerton, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 505, 508. See also MJ.
Bowman & D.J. Harris, Multilateral Treaties: Index and Current Status, at 29 (Supp.
1991). The U.S. was not a party to this agreement.
72. Handbook, Chapter 2, Section 34.
73. Neither the 1951 Convention nor the 1967 Protocol requires that adopting states
admit refugees, which enables each participating sovereign to maintain a level of author-
[Vol. 20
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tial guidance to applicants and countries who participated in the
admission of aliens.
Nonetheless, crises occurring around the world causing individuals
to flee their homelands continued after 1951, and the United Nations was
compelled to draft an instrument to address this growing problem. 74 The
1968 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees re-
moved the geographical and durational limitations of the previous Con-
vention to create a refugee policy that reflected the universal spirit of the
Convention. By allowing individuals who faced persecution in scattered
locations and times to seek refuge from persecution in countries all over
the globe, the Protocol created a long awaited and uniform basis for asy-
lum relief. The Protocol additionally bound its participants to comply
with the substantive provisions of the 1951 Convention, thus obligating
its signatories who had not adopted the Convention." Article 1.2 defines
a "refugee" as an individual who:
owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his national-
ity and is unable, owing to such fear... to return to it.76
It also prohibits contracting states from returning refugees to such
countries where their lives would be threatened because of five listed
factors."n This Protocol definition originated in the 1946 Constitution of
the International Refugee Organization (IRO).78 The IRO Constitution
classified a refugee as "a person who had a valid objection" to returning
to his native country, and stated that "fear, based on reasonable grounds
of persecution because of race, religion, nationality, or political opinion"
ity concerning the admission of refugees into their countries. Handbook, Chapter 2, Sec-
tion 34.
74. See Handbook, Section 8.
75. See Handbook, Section 9.
76. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 19 U.S.T. 6224, 6225 (1967)
(1968).
77. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 6276 (1967);
189 U.N.T.S. 150, 176 (1954). Article 33 of the Convention provides: "No Contracting
State shall expel or return a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territo-
ries where his life would be threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, member-
ship of a particular political social group or political opinion."
78. Constitution of the International Refugee Organization, 18 U.N.T.S. 3
(1948)(hereinafter "IRO Constitution"). The IRO was the first international organization
created by the United Nations. Fullerton, 26 CoRN.LL INT'L W. at 507, n. 11 (citation
omitted). The IRO Constitution provided regulations which governed new refugees and
regularized the treatment of refugees in several countries.
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was a valid objection.79 The Committee that drafted the definition in-
tended the "well-founded fear of persecution" phrase to mean that the
person has either "actually [been] a victim of persecution, or can show
good reason why he fears persecution." ' 0
The adoption of the IRO constitutional definition of a refugee by the
United Nations was meant to partially insure that refugees would receive
at least the same level of protection afforded to refugees before the crea-
tion of a formal instrument."' The Committee additionally articulated rea-
sonable grounds for persecution as meaning that "the applicant can give
a plausible and coherent account of why he fears persecution. '8 2 These
statements are particularly important in the adjudication of asylum
claims, as the intent of the drafters often provides crucial guidance in the
application and implementation of international refugee laws.
2. Political Opinion: From the Perspective of International Law
The success of the 1967 Convention is evidenced by its virtually
universal adoption. However, the drafters of this document failed to in-
clude a definition which may be used by immigration courts to determine
if applicants satisfy the five factors required for political asylum. Specifi-
cally, the Convention does not include a definition of the term "political
opinion." This failure creates a greater problem when determining
whether the expression of a desire to remain neutral in a political situa-
tion would satisfy the political opinion requirement.
The term "political opinion," in the realm of international law, has
been defined as an expression of an opinion on any matter "on which
the machinery of the state may be engaged."'8 3 The Handbook on Proce-
dures and Criteria For Determining Refugee Status (hereinafter "the
Handbook"), a guide which provides practical guidance on application of
the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol, also addresses the requirements
for political opinion.8 4 It states that the individual must not only hold
opinions opposed to those of the government, but also must fear persecu-
tion for holding these opinions.8 5 These opinions are presumed to be ones
79. IRO Constitution, Annex 1, Pt. 1, § Cl(a)(i), 18 U.N.T.S. 3, 19 (1948).
80. Cardoza-Fonesca, 480 U.S. at 438 (citations omitted).
81. U.N. ESCOR, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related
Problems, at 37, U.N. Doc. E/1618, EIAC.32/5 (1950) (hereinafter U.N. Rep.).
82. Cardoza-Fonesca, 480 U.S. at 438 (citations omitted).
83. RICmAD PLENDER, INTERNATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAw 432 (1988).
84. OFFICE OF THE UNnED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES. HANDBOOK
ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS, U.N. Doc- HCR/IP/4/
Eng. Rev.1. (1988) (hereinafter "Handbook").
85. Id. at § f, 19.
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which are not tolerated by authorities in the country fled from because
they criticize its policies and methods.86 Additionally, it is assumed that
these opinions have come to the attention of the appropriate authorities
who oppose them.87 The Handbook also notes that the importance of the
opinion, and the supposed detriment to the government flowing from its
exposure, are also relevant considerations when determining whether the
opinion was political in nature.88
The Handbook notes that an individual need not prove that the au-
thorities knew of his political opinion before he left the country. 9 In fact,
he may have concealed his opinion in order to escape persecution until
the point of his departure 0 The fact that the individual merely fears to
return can indicate the state of mind of the individual, and prove to be
dispositive in determining if the expression was political. 9' Additionally,
the Handbook states that an individual may fear persecution because of
his political opinion although he has not expressed any opinion to the au-
thorities at all.92 In such a situation, it could be assumed that the individ-
ual's convictions will be expressed somehow in the near future, and as a
result he will come into conflict with the government because of his po-
litical opinion.
Unfortunately, the Handbook does not address the issue of whether
a refusal to join the position of the government or authorities due to a
desire to remain neutral is an expression of political opinion which af-
fords refugee status. The conscientious objector serving in the armed
forces of a government whose practices he opposes will be required to
show that his opinion was political within the meaning of the Protocol.
The fact that his opinion may be considered neutral was addressed only
indirectly by the statement that the objector's convictions may become
known to the oppressor at a later date, and his refusal to stand against or
for the government may be considered an expression of political opinion.
It is increasingly evident that the United States neglects to examine inter-
national law in adjudicating claims of refugees, thus diluting the spirit
and viability of the treaty it signed in 1968.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 20.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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B. Commentary on United States Law
1. The Refugee Act of 1980
Prior to 1967, the United States had not joined the 1951 Conven-
tion, thus, it had not adopted the international definition of a refugee. In-
stead, it promulgated the Refugee Act of 1952, a statute which served as
the sole statutory authority governing refugee status in the United States.
However, the increasing need to create a uniform definition throughout
the world by which refugees may receive protection prompted the United
States to sign the United Nations Protocol of 1967. After signing the
Protocol of 1967, the U.S. began efforts to amend the Refugee Act of
1952. The primary goal of the amendment was to incorporate the Proto-
col into American law through the adoption of a statutory provision that
would govern all asylum procedures. Congress amended the 1952 Act in
1980 to include the international refugee definition and to provide a form
of relief for all individuals seeking political asylum in the United States.
In drafting the Immigration and Nationality Act, Congress intended to
adopt a universal definition that would provide adequate human rights
protections for all refugees seeking asylum in the United States. The Ref-
ugee Act of 1980 defines a refugee as:
any person who is outside any country of such person's na-
tionality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is
outside any country in which such person last habitually re-
sided, and who is unable or unwilling to avail himself or
herself of the protection of, that country because of persecu-
tion or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion.93
93. 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(42)(A) (1982). The decision to grant or deny asylum rests in
the discretion of the Attorney General of the United States. The Attorney General may
refuse refugee status to an applicant if:
(A) the alien ordered, incited, assisted or otherwise partici-
pated in the persecution of any person on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,
or political opinion;
(B) the alien, having been convicted of a final judgement of
a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the com-
munity of the United States;
(C) there are serious reasons for considering that the alien
has committed a serious nonpolitical crime outside the
United States prior to the arrival of the alien in the United
States; or
(D) there are reasonable grounds for regarding the alien as a
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This definition is identical in language to the Protocol definition of refu-
gees. Therefore, the legislative intent of the drafters of the Protocol is
helpful in interpretation of the Refugee Act to U.S. asylum applicants.
Congress interpreted the Protocol to provide two distinct forms of
relief: asylum and withholding of deportation. Section 243 of the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act grants the Attorney General discretion to
withhold deportation of an alien "to a country if the Attorney General
determines that such alien's life or freedom would be threatened in such
country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a partic-
ular social group, or political opinion." 94 This language requires an ob-
jective showing by the asylum applicant that he satisfy the requirements
of § 243(h).
The Supreme Court in INS v. Stevic held that Congress intentionally
drafted the statute to require no subjective showing by the applicant that
his life would be threatened. 95 The alien must only show "a clear
probability of persecution" through objective evidence that it is "more
likely than not" that he will be persecuted upon return to his country.9
The legislative intent of the drafters of the Refugee Act was to create an
instrument that was broad enough to include those who are persecuted,
homeless, and tormented by oppressive governmental regimes in their na-
tive countries. 97 However, in an attempt to create a more cohesive ap-
proach to the admission of refugees, the Court created an ambiguous
standard that has spawned federal decisions that are unsupported by in-
ternational statutory and legislative precedent.
Similar problems plague § 101 of the Act, which governs asylum
procedure in the United States. This section grants asylum to an applicant
who proves a well-founded fear of persecution by qualifying under one
or more of five listed factors. 9 Section 101(a)(42) of the Refugee Act of
1980 authorizes the BIA to grant asylum to an alien who is "unable or
danger to the security of the United States.
Id. Withholding of deportation is required where an alien's life or freedom would be
threatened on account of race, religion, membership in a social group, or political opin-
ion. See id.; 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982).
94. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub.L.No. 414, 243(h), 66 Stat. 166, 213
(1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
95. 467 U.S. 407, 416 (1984).
96. Id. at 424. See also INS v. Cardoza-Fonesca, 480 U.S. 421, 430 (1987).
97. 126 CONG. REc. 4501 (1980) (statement of Rep. Rodino); id. at 3758 (statement
of Sen. Thurmond).
98. Immigration and Nationality Act, 94 Stat. 102, 105 (1980), 8 U.S.C. § 1158
(1980). Section 208 of the Act grants the Attorney General discretion to grant asylum
claims of applicants, but this duty is delegated to the Us and Special Inquiry Officers to
expeditiously adjudicate asylum claims.
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unwilling to return to his native country because of persecution or a
well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion."99 The Su-
preme Court determined in INS v. Elias-Zacarias that a reviewing court
must uphold the BIA's denial of asylum if it is "supported by reasonable,
substantial, probative evidence on the record considered as a whole."'
The Elias-Zacarias court further defined this substantial evidence stan-
dard of review, as providing that the BIA's decision could only be re-
versed if the evidence presented by the asylum seeker "was such that a
reasonable fact finder would be compelled to conclude that the requisite
fear of persecution existed." 0 1
The Court in Elias-Zacarias held that an individual wishing to gain
asylum in the United States based on the assertion that a guerilla opposi-
tion party was attempting to recruit him would not satisfy the "well-
founded fear requirement," because the asylum seeker could not prove
that his opinions, or in the alternative, his persecutor's opinions were po-
litical. 10 2 Thus, according to the Court, the burden is on the asylum
seeker to present some evidence that he satisfies the well-founded fear
requirement, or that the motive of those who wish to persecute him is
political in nature.' 3
3. The Ninth Circuit Treatment of Refugees in the United States
The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly examined the issue of persecution
on the basis of political opinion. In 1984, it held that persecution is "on
account of political opinion" if the alien's motive or the persecutor's mo-
tive is political in nature.104 In Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that refusal to join a guerilla party because of a desire to be
neutral in a civil war was an expression of political opinion, entitling an
alien to political asylum.105 Later, in 1988, the Ninth Circuit broadened
the Bolanos-Hernandez ruling by holding in Arteaga v. INS that forced
recruitment by a guerilla party was persecution for political opinion when
the recruit had decided to refrain from supporting them."°6 The court de-
termined that the applicant need only show that he had affirmatively ex-
pressed his political opinion before leaving his native country, and that
99. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1980) (emphasis added).
100. 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992).
101. Id. at 817.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1984).
105. Id.
106. Arteaga v. INS, 836 F.2d 1227 (9th Cir. 1988).
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his persecutor's motives were political.' °7
In Zacarias v. INS, the Ninth Circuit held that forced recruitment to
a non-governmental group, the guerrillas, was persecution because of po-
litical opinion.10 8 The Supreme Court decided to review the Ninth Cir-
cuit's position on political neutrality. The Court ultimately rejected the
Ninth Circuit's standard, and held instead that the applicant must be able
to show that the persecutor's motivation is to punish the applicant be-
cause of his political opinion.' °9 The Court determined that the applicant
must establish that "he has a 'well-founded fear' that the guerrillas will
persecute him because of his political opinion, rather than because of his
refusal to fight with them." 0 In addition, the Court held that a persecu-
tor's generalized political motive for recruiting Elias-Zacarias into the
military was not sufficient to establish persecution because of political
opinion."' The Court questioned the Ninth Circuit's treatment of appli-
cants who claimed persecution because of a neutral political opinion. In
dicta, it questioned whether Elias-Zacarias' opinion was political in na-
ture, stating that there are several non-political reasons why an individual
may not wish to join the guerilla party. More importantly, the Court de-
termined that the phrase "persecution on account of political opinion"
means "persecution on account of the applicant's political opinion."" 2
Additionally, the court required that the applicant make a showing that
the persecutor's motives were in fact, political in nature.
In 1987, the Ninth Circuit created yet another standard that has yet
to be addressed by the Supreme Court. It held, in Canas-Sergovia v. INS,
that a political belief imputed to the applicant by his persecutor is
grounds for political asylum." 3 The Ninth Circuit utilized the "imputed
political belief" standard in Barraza-Rivera v. INS, where it held that
"punishment based on objection to participation in inhuman acts as part
of forced military service is 'persecution' within the meaning of the Ref-
ugee Act." 114
In Ramos-Vasquez v. INS, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Ramos-
Vasquez qualified for political asylum under both the political neutrality
107. Id.
108. 921 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1990).
109. Elias-Zacarias v. INS, 502 U.S. 478 (1992).
110. Id. at 816.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. 970 F.2d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 1992). The theory of imputed political belief first
arose in Lazo-Majano v. INS. See 813 F.2d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1987). See also Barraza-
Rivera v. INS, 913 F.2d 1443, 1449 (9th Cir. 1990).
114. Barraza-Rivera, 913 F.2d at 1453 (9th Cir. 1990).
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and the imputed political belief standard." 5 In doing so, the Court re-
jected Supreme Court precedent, and relied solely upon statutory interna-
tional law to support its holding. This bold step towards international re-
sponsibility demonstrates a willingness by the Ninth Circuit to obligate
the United States to the Protocol it signed in 1967.
IV. ANALYSIS
In Ramos-Vasquez v. INS, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that abandoning service in the military because of refusal to execute mili-
tary deserters was an expression of political opinion, and constitutes
grounds for political asylum. In doing so, it has rejected Supreme Court
precedent, but has embraced the universal spirit of refugee law by pro-
viding refuge to those who have no place to go. By appealing to the fun-
damental right to refuse to participate in acts which are morally repug-
nant, the court has raised an important question in refugee law: Should
federal courts look the other way, and return asylum applicants to their
native lands to be persecuted for refusal to commit acts which are con-
tary to basic rules of moral conduct?
A. A Holding at War with Precedent
In Ramos-Vasquez, the court addressed the applicant's argument that
his request for asylum was based upon his political neutrality. The court
stated that under Ninth Circuit caselaw, political neutrality constitutes a
political opinion for purposes of gaining political asylum in the U.S." 6
The court relied upon its decision in Arriaga-Barrientos to conclude that
the applicant "must not merely avow his political neutrality, however,
but must also show that his opinion was articulated sufficiently for it to
be the basis of his past or anticipated persecution." "7
The Supreme Court, however, in Elias-Zacarias held that the appli-
cant must provide "some evidence, direct or circumstantial" that his per-
secutor's motives are political." 8 The applicant must additionally show
that the evidence presented was so compelling that "no reasonable
factfinder could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution." 119 The nar-
row standard applied by the Supreme Court would make it virtually im-
possible for any applicant to gain reversal of a BIA decision on the
115. Ramos-Vasquez v. INS, 57 F.3d 857 (9th Cir. 1995).
116. Id. at 863.
117. 937 F.2d at 414.
118. 502 U.S. at 483.
119. Id.
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grounds of persecution on account of political opinion, including Jacobo
Ramos-Vasquez.
Ramos-Vasquez did not submit any evidence of newspaper accounts,
Amnesty international reports, or House and subcommittee reports to the
Immigration Judge or the BIA. Nor did he represent that his desertion
from the military was an expression of his desire to remain neutral in a
political situation. In fact, he asserted to the BIA that he left the military
because he did not want to execute his friend who had deserted the mili-
tary. This case would certainly be a factual scenario where the Supreme
Court would assert that Vasquez' purpose for leaving the military was
non-political, in that he did not want to execute a military order.
By holding that Ramos-Vasquez' desertion of the military for refusal
to participate in inhumane acts was an expression of political opinion, the
Ninth Circuit has opened asylum to all persons who refuse to follow
army orders, for whatever reasons. What the Supreme Court failed to
recognize, and the Ninth Circuit did, is that in countries whose armies
traditionally participate in military acts which are inhumane, the refusal
to participate in those acts is considered to be an act against the govern-
ment. Therefore, the refusal to follow a governmental order in some op-
pressive regimes will often be an assertion of a political opinion, whether
the individual refusing to participate wishes it to be or not.
B. A Holding in Harmony with International Law
Although the Ninth Circuit abandoned federal precedent in holding
Vasquez' military desertion to be an expression of political opinion, its
holding was consistent with international asylum law. The court cited the
Handbook of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees which
advised that, where "military action, with which an individual does not
wish to be associated, is condemned by the international community as
contrary to the basic rules of human conduct, punishment for desertion..
. [could], in itself be regarded as persecution."' 20 It also held that the
military's actions in Honduras were contrary to the provisions of the
Constitution of the Republic of Honduras. The court held that under the
Honduran Constitution, torture and capital punishment are forbidden, and
that military desertion may be the most effective way to express opposi-
tion to military practices which are in contravention of stated national
policy.
Such an analysis as that applied by the Ninth Circuit not only fur-
thers the goals of the 1967 Protocol, but also serves as reinforcement of
the notion that violations of human rights should not be tolerated by the
120. Handbook, at § 171, (cited in Ramos-Vasquez, 57 F.3d at 863).
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international community. Furthermore, the IRO, from which the INA
originated, defines a refugee as an individual who has a valid objection
to returning to his country. Political opinion would satisfy the valid ob-
jection requirement.' 2' As the purpose of the INA was to create a statu-
tory definition which would provide political asylum to those who are
homeless, persecuted, and oppressed, extension of asylum to Vasquez
would be consistent with that goal.
V. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit has prioritized the goals of the refugee statute
above the narrow interpretations given it by the Supreme Court. In doing
so, it has neutralized the legal technicalities which often plague the im-
migration system and has strengthened the commitment to human rights
obligations the United States undertook 29 years ago. Unfortunately, it is
probable that the Supreme Court will attempt to further define the "polit-
ical opinion" requirement, creating new tests and rigid standards with
which circuit courts must comply. In the process, millions of refugees,
just like Jacobo Ramos-Vasquez, will be sent back to the hands of their
oppressors to be abused, tortured, and murdered. Perhaps this decision
will force the judiciary to view asylum seekers as more than nameless
faces, but as human beings with rights as real as those Americans exer-
cise every day.
Jineki C. Butler
121. See Ramos-Vasquez, 57 .3d at 864.
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